For microgrids (MGs) with electric vehicle prosumers, effective time-of-use based energy trading is important for multi-vehicles-to-MG system. In this paper, a Stochastic Stackelberg game (SSG) model is proposed. The model is based on the Stackelberg game, where the sellers act as leader and the buyers are considered as follower. First, according to the distributed generation's (DG) output and load distribution, MGs are classified as sellers and buyers, whose strategies set are established separately. Then the utility models of sellers and buyers are established, which include a stochastic variable model for electric vehicles (EVs). Moreover, with the proof of equilibrium and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, sellers are obligated to coordinate the sharing of energy with maximization of the profit, while the buyers are autonomous to maximize their utilities with demands response to availabilities. Finally, the game equilibrium is solved to deal with the uncertainty of EV's energy and plugging-in time. By using the collected data from realistic EVs, the effectiveness of the model is verified in terms of seller profit, the utilities of buyers, and the net energy usage in MG. The results of the static pricing model and SSG model were compared to demonstrate the effectiveness of the SSG model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of connecting electric vehicles (EVs) to microgrids (MGs) has been proposed as early as 2011 [1] , [2] . Systems of EVs connected to MG, or vehicle-to-MG (V2M) systems [3] , [4] , have become a research focus in the field of MGs. The V2M system not only integrates the advantages of EVs and MGs, but also initiates the newly developed research fields of MGs. The application of the system is of great significance for green development in the global economy. Using electricity as energy, EVs contribute to environmental protection, by reducing harmful gas emissions. MGs are characterized by using solar energy and wind energy to generate electricity, so to reduce demand for coal and oil [5] , [6] .
Photovoltaic (PV) and wind turbine (WT) system are randomly distributed generators, which do not belong to the controllable micro-source. In order to increase system stability, MGs are generally equipped with energy storage The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chao Yang . units usually consisted of batteries. Under certain conditions, EVs in MGs are similar to vehicle-to-grid (V2G) systems. EVs act as the energy-storage unit of MGs, and can be scheduled by MGs [7] . The battery of electric vehicle has energy storage function, which is consistent with the original distributed energy storage (ES) function of MG. However, compared with ES, EV batteries have different access characteristics [8] . First of all, the batteries of electric vehicles are not connected to MG all day. Secondly, the time of access to MG presents a random distribution. Thirdly, the state of charge (SOC) of EV batteries after access also presents random distribution. Based on the above conditions, the battery of electric vehicle has different characteristics compared with ES. Finally, the batteries of EV are essentially MG loads. In other words, the plugging-out SOC of EV is larger than plugging-in SOC [9] . The scheduling principle of ES is that the SOC at the start and end of a scheduling cycle remains unchanged. Individual MG systems meet the system's power balance requirements by scheduling ES, such as the battery and EV surplus energies. However, when the capacity of VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ES and the EV charge-discharge conditions cannot meet the system's scheduling requirement, MGs should increase the controllable generation's output power or connect to an external power grid, such as a distribution network. In contrast, MG's surplus power could be stored in ES and EV's batteries or the electricity could be sold to the electricity market [10] . If surplus power is sold to the public utilities or to other MGs, a trading system should be established for MGs. However, the static electricity pricing model in the traditional power transaction cannot satisfy the MG system with EVs. With the development of MG systems, studies on power transactions have become a priority to support of MGs. At present, many research results and related literature have begun to seek the use of game equilibrium methods to establish the power transaction model of MGs.
State of art literatures has presented several game equilibrium methods. Wu et al. [7] proposed a stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) framework for the optimal energy management of a smart home with plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) energy storage, which models PEV energy storage availability by incorporating multiple random variables into a SDP control formulation of smart home energy management. An at-home EV charging scenario as a Stackelberg game was modeled in [9] , and proves that the game reaches an equilibrium point at which the EV charging requirements are satisfied. Within 24 hours, a game model and a Nash Equilibrium (NE) were provided between a public network (power utility) and multiple users of the time-of-use (TOU) price, by detailed proof and equilibrium point through analysis and deduction in [11] . However, the game mentioned only contains the traditional load users, but does not use ES, DG, or EVs. A faithful distributed mechanism is proposed in [12] for sharing the cost of electricity among a large number of strategic and distributed household agents that have private information, and discrete and continuous energy levels. Du et al. [13] put forwarded a cooperative game model of the multi-MG structure with demand-based management. Different types of the MG game user model are established by user classification for DG and ES. The strictly NE proofs and the solution of the game mode are presented. However, the model structure considers neither the public utility nor the plug-in EV. A Stackelberg game model was established under MGs and the public power utility in [14] , where utility function and strategies were established by "Leader" and "Follower" users. The existence and uniqueness of NE were proved. However, the sale of electricity that was selected randomly and stored in the MG did not consider the MGs' demand-satisfaction problem and justified the hypothesis, as well as the infinite ES capacity. Misra et al. [15] considered Markov decision process (MDP)-based decision approach to make strategies for customers to proper utilization of storage and self-generated energy with the grid energy. Mondal and Misra [16] raised a game-theoretic ENTRANT scheme between the PHEVs and MGs as a multi-leader and multi-follower in a Stackelberg game. This game model establishes the broader aspect for energy trading network in mobile MGs. A mixed game was provided under the MGs with EVs in [17] , in which consider both EV models as well as a PV power supply. However, the framework was proposed only for energy management in smart homes, not for multi-V2M energy exchanges. Mondal et al. [18] presented the HoMeS model for multiple-leader and multiple-follower in a Stackelberg game-theoretic approach, in which the optimal strategies of the MGs use a cooperative game while the customers use a non-cooperative game. A Stackelberg game for ES in MGs was established under deregulated electricity markets [19] . An effective energy-sharing management via a Stackelberg game approach was proposed for the operation. However, the model structure did not consider EV.
This paper proposed a stochastic Stackelberg games (SSG) approach for residential MGs energy trading with plug-in electric vehicles. The game model of sellers and buyers has been established, which considered a stochastic variable model for EVs. Sellers lead the competition by independently deciding the amount of energy for sale subject to a tradeoff between the attained satisfaction from the received revenue and that from the stored energy of ES or EVs. Buyers follow the sellers' actions by independently submitting a unit price bid to the sellers. Through rigorous game-theoretic analysis, we proved that the proposed approach converges to a unique equilibrium solution, and we showed that distributing the energy based on a well defined utility function can maximize the payoff for all participating MGs at the equilibrium of the game. This provides an incentive for energy trading among MGs in future power grids. In summary, our contributions in this paper are as follows. a) We present a SSG model for time-of-use based energy trading in MGs with plug-in EVs.
b) The utility model of MG sellers and buyers are established by distributed generation's output and load distribution of each MG, which considered the stochastic variable model for EVs with the uncertainty of plugging-in energy and time.
c) The existence and uniqueness of SSG equilibrium are strictly proved. The sellers' and buyers' game equilibrium solution for SSG has been rigorously derived.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly present the system structure of SSG in Section II. Section III describes the mathematical modeling of the game model. In Section IV, we formulate the stochastic variable model for dynamics EVs using Markov chain. The existence and uniqueness of game equilibrium are discussed in Section V. and game equilibrium solution has been rigorously derived in Section VI. Numerical results and discussion are presented in Section VII. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM STRUCTURE OF SSG
MGs with plug-in EVs have schedulable ES than traditional MGs without EVs. Originally, ES was set up to absorb the surplus power of PV and WT, however, it can also play the role of load regulation, thus making the MG profitable under the condition of time-of-use price. For example, it can be charged from the grid at a lower price and be discharged at a higher price. The amount of plug-in EVs in MGs, being an additional scheduled energy storage unit, will play a greater role in regulation and profit.
When MGs exchange energy with the electricity market, the power transaction is affected by the cost, demand, and other factors. The purchase and sale of electricity is a dynamically process [20] .
The SSG framework is shown in Fig. 1 . Participants in the game are classified into electricity sellers and buyers. The frame includes WT, PV, and GT (gas turbine) power generations. The direction of the arrow represents the power flow direction. The time interval is usually represented by t. GT power l gt t , WT output power P w t , PV output power P pv t , ES charge and discharge l bess t , EV charge and discharge power l ev t , and MG load for ordinary users L t are shown in Fig. 1 . Let d t be expressed by (1) .If L t is greater than sum of P pv t and P w t , obviously d t > 0, which results in MG purchase power l t to satisfy the power balance when ES and EV scheduling is still unable to meet the demand. Conversely, if d t < 0, the surplus power can be deposited into the ES or EV or sold to the power market [21] - [23] .
In the model architecture, multiple MG strategies are independent, non-cooperative, and non-protocol. Based on this premise, the Stackelberg game model of the two-party participation is established. In the Stackelberg game, the sellers of electricity are the dominant players, also known as leaders. The sellers take the strategy based on the sale of electricity to realize maximized profit. The buyers are followers in the game. According to the sales of electricity, the buyers will take the corresponding strategies by changing the power purchase bid to optimize the purchase price.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF SSG
There are three basic elements in the SSG: the players, the strategy sets, and the utility.
A. PLAYERS IN SSG
We consider that MGs are deployed in a region with DGs and EVs that are capable of generating and storing energy as well as loads that have demands for power. The MGs are connected to each other and can exchange energy with each other. The MGs are also connected to the utility and can exchange energy with the utility. Let the time be divided into consecutive fixed-length intervals. In each time interval, MGs have superfluous energy to sell to the market, whereas other MGs have no sufficient energy to support their demands and need to buy the shortfall from the market. We define I as the set of buyers when d t > 0 and J as the set of sellers when d t < 0, where I and J are two disjoint sets. Sellers lead the competition by independently deciding the amount of energy for sale subject to a tradeoff between the attained satisfaction from the received revenue and that from the stored energy. Buyers follow the sellers' actions by independently submitting a unit price bid to the sellers.
B. STRATEGY SETS IN SSG
The strategy set of seller j is expressed by (2) for any optimization period.
In (2), l j t is negative real number as selling power, which was chosen by MG seller j, expressed by (3).
and P j,w t represent user loads, PV and WT generation by seller j respectively. m j t in (4) represents the total power chosen by the ES or EV, and DG charge-discharge strategies of seller j in an optimization period t. r t is the EV plugging-in parameter in (5) . If the EV plugs into the MG between EV plugging-in time tin and plugging-out time tout, then r t = 1; otherwise, r t = 0.
In addition to general loads, MGs are also configured with DG, ES and EV. In an optimization period interval t, l is a random variable, so the boundary l j,ev is a stochastic parameter, which will be discussed in Section IV.
The strategy set of buyer i is expressed by (7) for any optimization period. In the formula, C i t represents the price that buyer i bids, C B is the purchase price of the utility, and C S is the price of the utility. The sellers' bids should not be higher than C S otherwise buyers will directly purchase electricity from the utility. The buyers' purchase price should not be lower than C B otherwise the sellers will directly trade with the utility.
C. UTILITY
In Stackelberg game, the buyer's strategy is the price of electricity, so (11) C i t is the buyer's only strategy variable which is information provide for seller. C S is a constant, determined by the power supply network, and not changed in the SSG. The seller's strategy is l j t (selling power by seller j), which is information provide for buyer. Proportional sharing applies to sides of the competition, where the energy is allocated to the buyers in proportion to their bids and where the revenue is allocated to the sellers in proportion to its sales.
Ignoring losses, the utility function model of seller j is represented by (8) in which U j t is the utility function of all electricity sellers, which does not mean that the system has only one seller. The utility function for seller j, considers two terms. The first term represents a payment from buyers. The second term represents the satisfaction. The utility function designed in this way aims for a balance between the attained satisfaction from storing the energy and that from selling the energy since the two terms are conflicting with each other.
Let l −j t = {l l t }l ∈ J \{j} be the strategy set of all sellers except seller j. Let ct = {C i t }i ∈ I be the strategy set of all buyers. Following the principle of proportional sharing, for each seller j, a payment from all buyers is allocated to the seller j in proportion to its sales. E i t is the total electricity purchased by buyer i, which is represented by (9) .Ê t , represented by (10) , is the sum of electricity sales by all sellers. S j t is a satisfaction function represented by (11) , which will be analyzed in part D.
Ignoring losses, the utility function model of buyer i is represented by (11) . The utility function for buyer i, considers two terms. The first term E i t C S represents the amount of money that buyer i needs to pay if it directly obtains the amount of energy from the macro-grid. The second term E i t C i t is the amount of money that buyer i is willing to pay for buying from the sellers. The utility is random expectation represent by E-symbol.
If the electricity purchased from the sellers is not sufficient, they will buy electricity from the utility, so the demand for the utility will always be satisfied. In (4) and (5), l j,ev t and r t are random variables, respectively, causing the existence of random variables l j t in the utility (8) and (11) by (3) and (4).
D. SATISFACTION FUNCTION
S t is the satisfaction rate of the MG seller. When the MG system has surplus power, it can be stored in the ES or EV according to different circumstances. When the MG is a power seller, condition l j t < 0 is established, as in (1). However, if d j t > 0, the load balance condition is required by the discharge of ES and EV. Under these circumstances, S t is set to a negative value. The satisfaction function reflects the demand satisfaction of the power seller in the actual power transaction, which must meet the following rules: 1) S t is a non-subtraction function.
2) S t is a concave function that gradually tends to saturate in the two directions of the axis.
The satisfaction function for seller j is set to:
The α and β are satisfaction parameters (α < 1, αβ < 0). By changing these parameters, the trend of the function final saturation will also be changed, as shown in Fig 2. MG has two choices with power surplus: either store it in EV or ES, or sell to electricity market. In extreme cases, MG discharges EV or ES to be sold with surplus power for profit. Satisfaction is set up in this paper to balance surplus power storage and sale, to prevent over-sale of electricity through EV or ES discharge. In Fig.2 , when l t > d t (l t /d t > 1), the actual power sold is larger than the surplus power, which indicates that EV or ES is discharged with S t < 0 to reduces profit for utility. On the contrary, when l t < d t (l t /d t < 1), the actual electricity sold is less than the surplus electricity, and EV or ES is charged with S t > 0 to compensation profit for utility.
In analytical (12) , St meets the following conditions:
The condition l j t < d j t < 0 means that MG j sells more electricity (l j t ) than the actual surplus (d j t ). In this case, m j t < 0 is satisfied in (3) . This can be explained by the fact that although MG does not have surplus electricity, for some reason, such as the current electricity price is considerable, MG can still profit from selling electricity through EV and ES discharges.
IV. STOCHASTIC VARIABLE MODEL FOR EVS A. DISTRIBUTION OF PLUGGING-IN AND PLUGGING-OUT TIMES
In (3) and (4), a plugging-in EV is defined as r t = 1 and an plugging-out EV is defined as r t = 0. Markov chain is modeled for dynamics of EV plugging-in time in (13) . The quantity p(t) is the transition probability of plugging-out time and q(t) is the transition probability of plugging-in time. The plugging-in and plugging-out transition probability are noted as p(t) and q(t), respectively, according to the data provided by [7] .
B. DISTRIBUTION OF PLUGGING-IN AND PLUGGING-OUT ENERGY
The initial SOC i of EV battery at plugging-in time is mostly affected by driving distance. In the model proposed in this paper, the driving distance D was only considered to compute the SOC i of EV's battery in formula (14) . SOC o and SOC r represent the SOC at plugging-out time and the distance that 1 kWh EV can drive, which is 6.7 km/kWh in [24] . SOC min represents the lowest SOC of the EV, which EV should not be less than with driving or discharging, otherwise the battery will be damaged. SOC i can be compute by D according to the statistical daily trip length distribution in [25] . Transition probability distribution of energy in EV equipped with 85 kWh batteries is shown in Fig. 3 . EV charging and EV battery capacity limitation should satisfy formula (15) . The η EV represents efficiency of charging EV. SOC min stand for minimum state of charge. If SOC of the battery is less than SOC min , the battery will be damaged too. 
V. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the buyer-level game, each buyer independently chooses its own strategy. In particular, buyer i submits its unit price c i t to the sellers. Knowing the strategies of each seller, i.e., the value of l j t for all j ∈ J , it aims to maximize utility function (11) . Since the buyers do not know the strategies of each other, a NE gives the set of strategies with the property that none of the buyers can increase its own utility by choosing a different strategy given the strategies of the other buyers and those of the sellers.
In the seller-level game, each seller also independently chooses its own strategy. In particular, seller j decides the value of l j t , aiming to maximize its utility. Based on utility function U j t (l j t , l −j t , c t ) defined in (8) , an alternative form of U j t (l j t , l −j t , c t ) that depends on the strategy of seller j and those of the buyers only can be obtain. In this way, the seller-level game reduces to a game where the utility of seller j can be maximized by simply finding the optimal strategy of seller j that maximizes its utility for a given profile of strategies for the buyers. According to the backward induction principle, the best response of each buyer from the buyer-level game will be found, and then, it will be plugged into the utility function of each seller and optimized correspondingly.
If the Nash equilibrium of a Stackelberg game exists, the following conditions hold:
A. Based on strategy set (7) , a non-cooperative game NE exists in buyers.
B. For any strategy c * t of buyers, the sellers can find the optimal strategy from strategy set (1) to optimize the sale of electricity.
A. PROOF (A)
In the period of an hour, the buyers select a determined strategy from (7) to bid on electricity. Therefore, the strategy VOLUME 7, 2019 set described is a pure strategy. The NE of a pure-strategy game must meet the following two conditions to be solved: 1) Strategy set (7) is a non-empty compact convex set in the Euclidean space.
2) Utility function (11) is continuous and quasi-concave for strategy set (7) .
In strategy set (7) , the constraint condition is a linear inequality, so condition 1) is proved.
If the utility function is proved to be a concave set, the necessary and sufficient condition is a semi-definite Hansen matrix of formula (16) :
In (16),c i t1 and c i t2 represent the price of electricity purchased by buyer i in two different periods of time. First, simultaneous equations (9) and (11) are used to obtain the first-order partial derivative of H (U i t ):
Then, the second-order partial derivative is obtained:
It is observed in (16) that all the diagonal elements of the matrix are less than 0 and that the non-diagonal elements are all 0, so it is a semi-positive proof. The utility function satisfies condition 2). Therefore, condition A is proved.
B. PROOF (B)
Let (17) equal 0, thus (19) it yields.
For any strategy of the buyer's strategy set, the utility function of the seller is (20) .
The first and second derivatives of (20) are obtained, as in (21) and (22) , respectively.
Formula (22) shows that the second-order derivative of U j t is negative, so the utility function of the sellers is a strict convex set. Let (21) be equal 0, resulting in (23) .
For any strategy c * t , (23) is the optimal strategy for the seller. Therefore, condition B is proved. In summary, a two-level Stackelberg game, which includes buyers and sellers, has unique game equilibrium.
VI. GAME EQUILIBRIUM SOLVING
To solve the equilibrium point of the model in Section V, the inverse regression algorithm is generally used. First, buyers bid on the electricity, and then sellers set the electricity purchase price according to the formulation of the strategy and determine the sale of electricity. Finally, MGs, according to the price and sale of electricity and the time of the sale, select DGs, and the ES's and EV's charging and discharging to optimize the electricity-generation costs. probabilities of EV mobility (e.g. r t and SOC i ). The output are c i * t and l Fig. 9 shows that the price in our proposed SSG model is 56.2%and 67.5% lower than that in fixed tariff which set by utility, respectively. Therefore, the energy traded by the MGs is less costly utilized using SSG than using fixed tariff. To make the comparison more obvious, the power distribution curve is replaced by peak histogram in Fig.11 . The daily total charge-discharge power of EV in SSG model is less than that in traditional model. EV using SSG achieves battery charge and discharge energy reduction with less battery loss. Moreover, the life of the EV power battery will be improved and the full capacity is still guaranteed to leave the MG. In Fig. 12 , the peak load is shown. The peak port-load using static strategy for MG No. 1 is totally higher using SSG. Thus, it can be seen that the power distribution is closer to the average. The SSG play the role of ''cutting the peak and filling the valley.'' Table 3 shows that the total cost of the MG No. 1 is 12.8% lower using SSG than using static electricity-trading model. Therefore, each MG, using SSG, gets a higher profit, than using static strategy. Further, less export energy to utility grid by SSG shows that the proposed method has positive effects on the distribution system with lower power loss and a higher profit for MGs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an SSG method for a MG considering plug-in electric vehicles. The method is mainly taken from MG viewpoint to coordinate the energy sharing to achieve maximum profit. Moreover, this paper considers the rationality and possible multiple stochastic variables of EV plugging-in and plugging-out time and energy models. Based on Stackelberg game, we have designed a game model consisted of the utility model of sellers and buyers. Furthermore, a time-of-use optimal pricing model based on SSG is proposed, where the seller acts as the leader and the buyers are considered as the followers. We have also expressed the equilibrium and proved uniqueness of the NE of the game. Finally, by using the SSG model, the results have shown that the total cost of MGs can be reduced by coordinating the energy sharing between others, compared with directly trading with utility grid under the static electricity-trading model. The internal price based on SSG exerts a positive effect on the final net energy profile of the MG. By analyzing the hourly deviation between static electricity price strategy and SSG total load peak value, the final load distribution is closer to the average but the effect was limited. The proposed work can be extended to construct an energy trading framework in the distribution grid level. The establishment of the model by convex functions avoids the NP-hard problem, but causes the weakness of the adaptability of this model such as the average division of profits. Interesting works can be done to form NE model with incomplete information. The network tariff, power losses, and congestion of distribution grid should further be considered. 
